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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to extend the model of Cecchetti and Ehrmann 2000 to study the
case of developing countries that have a constraint in conducting their monetary policies.
Contrary to Cecchetti and Ehrmann 2000 model, our model shows that the existence of such
a constraint i.e. cost restriction allows the aggregate demand shock to affect the
output−inflation variability. Our model also shows that adding a monetary policy cost
restriction to the central bank loss function leads to either a steeper or flatter efficient frontier.
This implies that the effect of monetary policy to offset aggregate demand and supply shocks
is reduced.
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1.  Introduction 
Central bank policymakers in any country in the world, developed and developing alike, 
seek the same goals; namely to stabilize output and price about some path that is expected to be 
optimal. Developed countries do not have technical constraints in applying monetary policy i.e. 
open market operation. However, developing countries have. This technical difference is due to 
the fact that developed countries have well-developed and sophisticated financial markets 
compared to developing countries. 
One of the major and crucial issues in recent times is that central banks in developing 
countries, engaged in conducting monetary policy by using indirect control, find that they should 
intervene and create their own instrument to conduct open market operations
1 because their 
financial markets are underdeveloped. This entails a high cost in the form of negative profits
2. 
This issue raises the question about the validity and continuity of such policies in these countries.     
            Literature shows a lack of academic studies in this area of research. We believe this lack 
of interest stems from the fact that economists are more interested in describing the behavior of 
monetary policy in developed countries i.e. the U.S and EMU. Hence, the goal of this paper is to 
focus on the effect of such constraint on the output-inflation variability.  
 2.  Policy Formulation  
Recent research in monetary economics focuses on finding the optimal monetary policy, 
i.e. the level of the interest rate, that minimize a quadratic loss function (see, for example, Taylor 
(1979), Cecchetti (1998), Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000)). The contribution of this paper is to 
expand the quadratic loss function by adding a third preference, consistent with a real case, to 
minimize the fluctuation of central bank cost. The policy target is to minimize “(1)” subject to 
“(2)”, “(3)” and “(4)” below: 
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Equation “(1)” is a general form of a quadratic loss function for one period
3. E denotes 
the mathematical expectation. π
*, y
* and c
* are the desired level of inflation, output and central 
bank cost of conducting monetary policy, respectively. The parameters α, η and (1-α-η) are the 
weights of interest. Equation “(4)” shows that cost has a negative relation with the money supply 
(m
s) because issuing more securities i.e. certificate of deposits (contractionay monetary policy) 
means higher value of interest payments on those securities. Equations “(2)” and “(3)” describe 
the dynamic structure of the economy (output and inflation). dt and st are aggregate demand and 
supply shocks, respectively. The source of Equations “(1)” to “(3)” is Cecchetti and Ehrmann 
(2000), but adjusted with equation “(4)” to meet the goal of this paper. We replaced interest rate 
by money supply because we target the former by the latter. 
                                                      3. Central Bank Losses and Monetary Policy   
Central bank losses can arise in one of two ways: first, operating losses which occur 
when operating costs exceed operating income. Operating cost includes mainly the interest rate 
paid on all accounts and instruments. On the other hand, operating income encompasses income 
                                                 
1 For more details about the countries that have used central bank securities and the countries that have switched to central bank 
securities see Quintyn (1994).  
2 Data from the central bank of Jordan provide evidence, for more details see Sweidan and Maghyereh (2005). 
3 For more details about multiperiod function see Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999).   2
from local and foreign investments. Second, valuation losses which mean losses arising from the 
revaluation of assets and liabilities. For the purpose of the current paper, we believe that 
monetary policy will be ineffective when a central bank operates with such significant operating 
losses. However, losses arising from revaluation do not have the same effect as operating losses. 
Real world evidence which comes from two neighboring countries, Jordan and Israel may 
clarify this point further. The data in Table (I), below, from both countries over the period (1996-
1999) shows that the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) and the Bank of Israel (BOI) suffered net 
losses. But, the main difference between the two countries is that the losses in Jordan are related 
to the monetary policy itself. During the period (1996-1999) the CBJ intervened aggressively in 
the market by creating certificates of deposit to absorb the excess liquidity. Certificates of 
deposit are non-income earning instruments used in the conduct of open market operation. This 
move was taken at a time when interest rates were high, averaging 8%. This constituted a high 
cost to the CBJ. For this reason, the CBJ suffered significant losses during the period under 
study. We are therefore, led to believe that these losses may push the monetary authority in 
Jordan to ease its monetary policy.  
                                                              
                                                                 Table (I) 










          Source: annual reports of the CBJ and the BOI, different issues. 
 
In the case of the BOI, the balance sheet shows that foreign exchange reserves constitute 
the main assets of the BOI, amounting to almost 87% of total assets. Consequently, the exchange 
rate regime allows the rate to move within a wide band. The wide exchange rate fluctuations led 
the BOI to suffer losses over the period (1996-1999). This suggests that the losses in the BOI are 
related to exchange rate differentials (revaluation). Moreover, the data from the BOI shows that 
the main monetary instruments in Israel are: monetary loans; deposits auctions and treasury bills. 
Some of these instruments are income-earning assets which guarantee some revenues to the BOI.   
Evidence from the consolidated balance sheet of the Federal Reserve System, shows that 
the U.S. government securities are the largest category of its assets, it is approximately 90.0%. 
This implies that these securities are income-earning assets. Furthermore, in a recent study, 
Dalton and Dziobek (2005) illustrate that central banks of several developing countries such as 
Brazil and Chile suffered losses because of the interest differential between the cost of domestic 
liabilities and returns on their assets. Overall, there is no doubt that conducting a monetary policy 
in any country has some cost. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that adopting a monetary policy 
that goes much beyond conventional central banking functions causes losses to the central bank. 
If this is the case, one may question the effectiveness of an independent monetary policy when 







in the CBJ 
Million $ 
Losses/Profits 
in the BIO 
Million $ 
1996 -18.9  -456 -26.6  -140.3 
1997 -12.4  -1,095  -17.5  -309.3 
1998 -10.0  10,943  -14.1  2,630.5 
1999              -30.7  -8,731  -43.3  -2,103.9   3
financial markets are not yet fully developed. Therefore, we believe these central banks should 
re-evaluate and minimize the cost of their monetary policy. 
                                                                        4. Results 
Appendix A demonstrates the results of the optimization problem stated above. We 
compare the result of this optimization problem (including monetary policy constraint) with the 
results of Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) (without constraint). It is clear that the original model 
by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000), equation “(A5)”, shows that the monetary policy offsets 
aggregate demand shocks, one-for-one relationship (a0=1). However, the existence of a 
constraint in applying monetary policy i.e. cost constraint makes monetary policy unable to 
offset completely an aggregate demand shock, equation “(A10)”, (a1<1). Furthermore, the results 
illustrate that the value of b1, equation “(A11)”, is less than b0, equation “(A6)”. This means that 
the response of monetary policy to supply shock can be described as limited or conservative. 
These two outcomes lead to the conclusion that a restricted monetary policy leads to more 
fluctuation in the economy. And that it is unable to push the economy back to the equilibrium. 
Moreover, this result is also confirmed by calculating the variability of output (σ
2
y) and inflation 
(σ
2
π). The original model, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) in equations (“(A7)” and “(A8)”), 
concludes that the variability of both output and inflation depends only on the variance of the 
aggregate supply shock (σ
2
s), and not on the variance of the aggregate demand shock (σ
2
d). 
However, with a conservative monetary policy the result will be changed. It is clear from 
Appendix A, equations (“(A12)” and “(A13)”), that output and inflation variability are affected 





Given the values of γ, ω and ψ, the additional preference (cost constraint) in central bank 
loss function implies that the policymakers have preference dispersion. This analysis assumes 
that the policymakers focus more on the cost of monetary policy as a priority. As a result, they 
have two scenarios: either to give attention to the cost of monetary policy and output variability; 
or to the cost of monetary policy and inflation variability. If the central bank places a fixed 
weight on targeting inflation, output oscillates. However, if the central bank places a fixed 
weight on the output then inflation rate fluctuates. This analysis postulates that the existence of 
the cost constraint in the loss function forces the central bank to concentrate on one of two 
targets either output or  inflation.  From a technical point of view, the efficient frontier
4 could be 
either steep or flat, equation “(A15)”, which depends on the preferences of the central bank.  In 
sum, the existence of cost constraint in performing monetary policy, limits the ability of 
monetary policy to affect aggregate demand. In addition, adopting a tight monetary policy is 
costly.  
                                                                     5. Conclusion 
This paper shows that the existence of constraints in conducting monetary policy, i.e. 
high monetary policy cost, leads to either a steeper or a flatter efficient frontier. This means 
inefficient monetary policy; its effect to offset aggregate demand and supply shocks is small. 
This theoretical analysis sheds light on the fact that developing countries which adopt an 
economic adjustment program with a constrained (non-well developed) monetary policy, are 
unable to control output and inflation variability efficiently. Moreover, combating inflation under 
such circumstances is extremely expensive. 
                                                             
                                                 
4 This frontier shows the trade-off between output and inflation variability, for more details see Cecchetti, Flores-
Lagunes and Krause (2004). 
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                                                                       Appendix A 
                                                             
Cecchetti and Ehrmann 2000 model 
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